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FEDERAL REGULATORY RESPONSES  
TO THE PRESCRIPTION OPIOID CRISIS: 




I first wrote about opioid analgesics more than fifteen years ago.1 After 
contrasting the clinical mindset of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
with the law enforcement mentality of the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA), I called for a public health perspective of the sort embodied by the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).2 Alas, it took a dozen years for 
the CDC to answer that challenge, issuing guidelines that recommended cautious 
prescribing by primary care physicians.3 Separately, my 2003 article had urged the 
FDA to consider more aggressive distribution controls,4 but that agency’s 
subsequent efforts to further restrict access to powerful narcotics strike me as 
entirely too feeble.5 Watching this crisis continue to deepen—while various 
government actors engaged in little more than posturing—has convinced me that we 
needed stronger medicine from the outset. 
Part I of this Article suggests that the medical establishment shares more blame 
for the crisis than many commentators seem to appreciate. Part II canvasses a variety 
of ways in which the federal government has responded to the opioid problem during 
the last few years before delving more deeply into the FDA’s role in the mess, 
                                                   
* © 2019 Lars Noah. Chesterfield Smith Eminent Scholar, University Term Professor, 
and Professor of Law, University of Florida; author, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL 
TECHNOLOGY (Foundation Press 4th ed. 2017). 
1 Lars Noah, Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management Technologies, 
31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 55 (2003). 
2 See id. at 64 (“A public health perspective, which the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) has expressed in connection with antibiotics as well as vaccine programs, 
might help to mediate between these two potentially incompatible perspectives.” (footnote 
omitted)); id. at 56 (“[R]ecommending a public health approach that attempts to bridge the 
FDA’s predominantly clinical focus and the DEA’s preoccupation with the potential adverse 
consequences for third parties.”). 
3 The CDC proposed guidelines in 2015, which it finalized the following year. See 
Sabrina Tavernise, New Standards for Painkillers Aim to Stem Overdose Deaths, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2016, at A1 (summarizing some of the controversy surrounding the issuance 
of these technically nonbinding guidelines). The CDC recommended, among other things, 
that physicians first try nonopioid therapies—and then prescribe only a three- to seven-day 
course of opioids—when treating patients with acute pain. See Deborah Dowell et al., CDC 
Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain—United States, 2016, 315 JAMA 1624, 
1638 box 5 (2016); Thomas R. Frieden & Debra Houry, Reducing the Risks of Relief—The 
CDC Opioid-Prescribing Guideline, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1501, 1503 (2016) (“When 
prescribing opioids, the rule of thumb is to ‘start low and go slow.’”). 
4 See Noah, supra note 1, at 64. 
5 See infra Part II.D. 
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assessing the different tools that it has tried to use as well as some that it failed to 
employ. This Article concludes that the agency should have allowed only a narrowly 
defined subset of physicians to prescribe opioid analgesics, even though the medical 
community would have pitched a fit about any such an intrusion on its prerogatives, 
to say nothing of the drug manufacturers aghast at the prospect of far more modest 
sales. Greater use of such restrictions on distribution might have worked to nip this 
disaster in the bud, and it needs more serious consideration by the FDA before the 
next one comes down the pike. 
 
I.  SEARCHING HIGH AND LOW FOR CULPRITS 
 
The prescribing of opioids peaked almost a decade ago,6 but the consequences 
of the resulting addiction and abuse will linger for many years to come, with few 
good solutions in sight. Although there is plenty of blame to go around,7 and the 
latest wave of tort litigation has identified some handy targets in the industry,8 it 
remains useful to try to understand how this happened—and might have been 
avoided—before a different category of overused pharmaceutical products ushers in 
the next public health crisis.9 
                                                   
6 See Anne Schuchat et al., New Data on Opioid Use and Prescribing in the United 
States, 318 JAMA 425, 425 (2017); Abby Goodnough, Report Finds a Decline in Opioid 
Prescriptions After a 2010 Peak, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2017, at A13. 
7 See Robert J. Blendon & John M. Benson, The Public and the Opioid-Abuse Epidemic, 
378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 407, 410 (2018) (reporting that one recent opinion poll found that 
“the public placed the most blame on doctors who inappropriately prescribe painkillers 
(33%)”); id. at 408 (presenting results from the same poll which showed that 13% blamed 
pharmaceutical companies and 7% blamed the FDA). 
8 As I have explained in commenting to the press, however, this strikes me as 
unproductive scapegoating. See Harriet Ryan, Washington City Sues OxyContin Drugmaker; 
Everett, Hit Hard by Opioid Addiction, Alleges That Purdue Pharma Ignored Criminal 
Trafficking, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2017, at A1; Mitch Smith & Monica Davey, With 
Overdoses on Rise, Cities and Counties Look for Someone to Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 
2017, at A18 (“Critics say the litigation is a sideshow in the opioid debate—a chance for 
lawyers to make money and politicians to make headlines—rather than a lasting solution in 
the overwhelming crisis . . . .”). 
9 See, e.g., ALAN SCHWARZ, ADHD NATION: CHILDREN, DOCTORS, BIG PHARMA, AND 
THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN EPIDEMIC (2016) (discussing the burgeoning use of Schedule 
II stimulants approved to treat attention deficit hyperactivity disorder); Kirk E. Evoy et al., 
Abuse and Misuse of Pregabalin and Gabapentin, 77 DRUGS 403, 404 (2017) (observing that 
“less publicized is the increasing abuse of prescription drugs once considered to have little 
or no abuse potential, among them gabapentin and pregabalin”); id. at 424 (concluding a 
systematic review of the available literature with a call for greater attention to the possibility 
of abuse but not yet restrictions on the use of gabapentinoids); Anna Lembke et al., Our 
Other Prescription Drug Problem, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 693, 694 (2018) (“Despite the 
many parallels to the opioid epidemic, there has been little discussion in the media or among 
clinicians, policymakers, and educators about the problem of overprescribing and overuse of 
benzodiazepines . . . .”); cf. Stephen Mihm, Opinion, This Isn’t the First U.S. Opiate-
Addiction Crisis, CHI. TRIB., July 17, 2017, at A11 (“The first great U.S. opiate-addiction 
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After some time away from the narrower subject of narcotic analgesics, I have 
now come to believe that the medical community deserves a fair dose of the blame 
for what has happened. I do not mean venal operators of pill mills or other bad apples 
among health care professionals;10 instead, I have in mind the far larger number of 
well-intentioned physicians who have allowed themselves to get duped too easily 
and then found themselves far out of their depths.11 The drumbeat about the 
undertreatment of pain began in earnest in the late 1980s,12 and not long thereafter 
medical experts began urging their colleagues to rethink the well-entrenched 
resistance to using opioids, relying on only the barest of evidence to make their 
point.13 Rather than celebrate caution in the use of narcotic analgesics, these 
                                                   
epidemic [i.e., the use of morphine after the Civil War] began much the same way, with 
medications handed out by well-meaning doctors who embraced a wondrous new class of 
drugs as the answer to a wide range of aches and pains.”). 
10 See Carrie Teegardin, Years into the Opioid Crisis, the Nation Still Struggles to Rein 
in Doctors, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 3, 2017, at A1 (“[S]ince 2016, more than 1,000 doctors 
have been brought before medical boards for improperly prescribing opioids to patients. In 
that same time, nearly 150 have been in federal court on opioid drug charges. Every month, 
authorities bust another round of doctors gone rogue.”). 
11 See Carrie Teegardin, The Opioid Crisis; Doctors Rethink Pain Treatment, ATLANTA 
J.-CONST., Dec. 7, 2017, at A1 (“[W]ell-meaning physicians who were trained to 
aggressively treat pain are also a big part of the problem.”); Editorial, Doctors Fueled Opioid 
Crisis. Can They Help Cure It?, USA TODAY, Mar. 20, 2018, at A5 (“Physicians, many of 
them well-meaning, helped fuel the crisis by handing out opioids like candy.”); id. (“Far too 
many physicians haven’t changed their prescribing habits, even in the face of government 
guidance, state restrictions, heavy news coverage and studies showing the advantages of 
other painkillers.”); see also Jonathan H. Chen et al., Distribution of Opioids by Different 
Types of Medicare Prescribers, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 259, 260–61 (2016) (“High-
volume prescribers are not alone responsible for the high national volume of opioid 
prescriptions. Efforts to curtail national opioid overprescribing must address a broad swath 
of prescribers to be effective.”). 
12 See, e.g., Julie A. Steele, Cancer Pain: Its Management Emerges as Public Health 
Issue, 82 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 646 (1990); Daniel Goleman, Patient Care; Physicians 
Said to Persist in Undertreating Pain and Ignoring the Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1987, 
at B5. 
13 See, e.g., Pamela T.M. Leung et al., Letter, A 1980 Letter on the Risk of Opioid 
Addiction, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2194, 2194 (2017) (finding that a “five-sentence letter . . . 
was heavily and uncritically cited as evidence that addiction was rare with long-term opioid 
therapy”); Marcia L. Meldrum, The Ongoing Opioid Prescription Epidemic: Historical 
Context, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1365, 1365 (2016) (describing the handful of publications 
from the 1980s that “became the rather fragile foundation of a 20-year campaign for the long-
term use of opioids in chronic noncancer pain”); see also Roger Chou et al., The Effectiveness 
and Risks of Long-Term Opioid Therapy for Chronic Pain: A Systematic Review for a 
National Institutes of Health Pathways to Prevention Workshop, 162 ANNALS INTERNAL 
MED. 276, 283 (2015) (“[R]eliable conclusions about the effectiveness of long-term opioid 
therapy for chronic pain are not possible due to the paucity of research to date.”); id. at 282 
(“[T]he lack of scientific evidence on effectiveness and harms of long-term opioid therapy 
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popularizers condemned “opiophobia” as unenlightened, even barbaric.14 Drug 
manufacturers, of course, saw this as an emerging business opportunity, and an 
ineffectual FDA quickly lost control of the situation. In short, this country had the 
conditions for a perfect storm that has left lasting damage.15 
Almost a quarter of a century has passed since the FDA approved an extended-
release (ER) version of the Schedule II drug oxycodone (OxyContin®).16 As a 
consequence of an aggressive promotional campaign for this controlled substance,17 
OxyContin quickly became an unexpected blockbuster for its manufacturer, Purdue 
Pharma.18 This product hardly represented the first opioid analgesic licensed by the 
                                                   
for chronic pain is clear and is in striking contrast to its widespread use for this 
condition . . . .”). 
14 See Thomas Catan & Evan Perez, A Pain-Drug Champion Has Second Thoughts, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2012, at A1; Peter Whoriskey, The Prescription Painkiller Binge, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2012, at A1 (“[D]rug manufacturers and some pain specialists helped 
create a body of scientific research assuaging the long-standing worries about opioids and 
pushed to expand the use of the drugs . . . . [One prominent academic funded by the industry] 
has since expressed regret for his evangelism on behalf of opioids.”). 
15 See William C. Becker & David A. Fiellin, Editorial, Limited Evidence, Faulty 
Reasoning, and Potential for a Global Opioid Crisis: Other Countries Must Learn from the 
Public Health Devastation in the US, 358 BMJ j3115 (2017); see also Darlena Cunha, 
Chronic Pain Meets Worries About Opioid Addiction, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2016, at E1 (“The 
United States uses 80 percent of the world’s opioids, . . . yet it makes up less than 5 percent 
of the world’s population.”). See generally ANNA LEMBKE, DRUG DEALER, MD: HOW 
DOCTORS WERE DUPED, PATIENTS GOT HOOKED, AND WHY IT’S SO HARD TO STOP ch. 4 
(2016). 
16 See Paul Tough, The Alchemy of OxyContin, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 29, 2001, at 32. 
17 See Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial 
Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 221–23, 225 (2009). 
18 See Chris Adams, Painkiller’s Sales Far Exceeded Maker’s Plans—Purdue Pharma 
Scrambled to Expand Its Production of OxyContin Medication, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2002, 
at D2. For more about the history of this drug, though focusing on Purdue’s success in 
blocking generic competition, see Lars Noah, Product Hopping 2.0: Getting the FDA to Yank 
Your Original License Beats Stacking Patents, 19 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 161, 172–
79 (2015); Ameet Sarpatwari et al., The Opioid Epidemic: Fixing a Broken Pharmaceutical 
Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 466–74 (2017) (contrasting the experience with 
Purdue’s older ER morphine product MS Contin®). The recommendations offered by the 
latter set of commentators had little, however, to do with the particular hazards of opioid 
analgesics; indeed, their ideas for challenging weak patents and responding to 
anticompetitive behaviors, see id. at 477–84, would, on balance, only make the problem 
worse by driving down prices and increasing supply, see Barrett Devlin et al., U.S. on Alert 
for Canadian Drugs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2012, at A2 (“Generic medications are usually 
welcomed in the marketplace as less-expensive alternatives to popular drugs. But in the case 
of painkillers, many health advocates are wary they will undo years of effort to make it harder 
for addicts to abuse the pills.”); Anna Wilde Mathews & Leila Abboud, FDA Approves 
Generic OxyContin; Teva, Endo Get Clearance After Agreeing to Implement Abuse-
Reduction Programs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2004, at A3 (“Law-enforcement officials have 
long been concerned about the potential for a bigger, cheaper, less well-controlled supply 
once versions of OxyContin are marketed by multiple companies.”). 
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FDA,19 but the decision to approve it has left a painful legacy for this country.20 
Nonetheless, the agency continued to approve other long-acting (LA) opioids,21 
including Opana ER® (oxymorphone) in 2006,22 the novel Schedule II analgesic 
Nucynta® (tapentadol) in 2008,23 the transdermal patch Butrans® (buprenorphine) in 
2010,24 and Zohydro ER® (hydrocodone) in 2013,25 as well as novel dosage formula-
tions of the even more powerful narcotic fentanyl such as Onsolis® (buccal soluble 
                                                   
19 See Jerry Mitchell & Laura Ungar, How Painkillers Became Killers, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, Jan. 29, 2018, at A9 (“In 1950, the FDA approved Percodan, which combined 
oxycodone with aspirin. Nearly a quarter-century later, Percocet—a combination of 
oxycodone and acetaminophen—followed.”). The agency also previously had authorized the 
sale of combination drugs using hydrocodone (e.g., Vicodin® and Lortab®). See Noah, supra 
note 1, at 62; see also id. at 58 (referencing the FDA-approved Schedule II drugs 
hydromorphone (e.g., Dilaudid®) and meperidine (e.g., Demerol®)). Nonetheless, in this era 
the FDA appeared to share some of the medical community’s opiophobia. See id. at 57 (In 
approving Zomax® (zomepirac) in 1980, “agency reviewers thought that it could substitute 
for narcotics used in the treatment of severe pain. This excessive concern about patient use 
of any controlled substances—so much so that it would displace the FDA’s normal resistance 
to approving nonessential products that create a risk of cancer—appears repeatedly in other 
contexts.” (endnote omitted)). 
20 See Susan Okie, How One Painkiller Led to Nationwide Heartbreak, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 30, 2018, at B6 (reviewing BETH MACY, DOPESICK: DEALERS, DOCTORS, AND THE 
DRUG COMPANY THAT ADDICTED AMERICA (2018)); see also Betsy McKay, U.S. Life 
Expectancy Declines Further, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2018, at A1 (“Drug-overdose deaths 
skyrocketed between 2015 and 2017, particularly for adults between ages 25 and 54. The 
main culprit was fentanyl and other synthetic opioids that became pervasive in illicit drug 
supplies in the U.S. around that time. Deaths from synthetic opioids rose 45% in 2017, while 
the death rate from heroin, which had risen sharply after 2010, was flat.”). 
21 See Sabrina Tavernise, Pressured on Opioids, F.D.A. Takes Steps to Toughen Stance, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2016, at A12 (“The F.D.A. has come under fire for continuing to approve 
opioids.”). 
22 See Linda Loyd, Endo Gets Painkiller Approval, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 24, 2006, at 
E1; cf. infra note 82 and accompanying text (explaining that the manufacturer withdrew a 
follow-on version of this drug in 2017). 
23 See Final Rule, Schedules of Controlled Substances: Placement of Tapentadol into 
Schedule II, 74 Fed. Reg. 23,790, 23,791 (May 21, 2009) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt 1308); 
see also Sheridan M. Hoy, Tapentadol Extended Release: In Adults with Chronic Pain, 72 
DRUGS 375, 389–90 (2012) (discussing the long-acting version approved by the FDA three 
years later). 
24 See Victoria Colliver, Controlling Chronic Pain Without Dangerous Drugs, S.F. 
CHRON., June 5, 2013, at C1. Because it carries a lower risk of abuse, buprenorphine falls 
into Schedule III. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.13(e)(2)(i) (2018). At higher doses, this long-acting 
opioid has become a popular medication for treating opiate addiction. See infra note 77 and 
accompanying text. 
25 See Lars Noah, State Affronts to Federal Primacy in the Licensure of Pharmaceutical 
Products, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 3–7, 13–16 (discussing this controversial approval and 
the efforts of a few states to prohibit use of the drug); id. at 4 (explaining that the approval 
“drew howls of protest from public health experts and law enforcement officials”); id. at 12 
(“[M]any observers had misgivings about the wisdom of the FDA’s risk-benefit judgment 
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film) and Subsys® (sublingual spray).26 Most recently, the FDA approved a sublin-
gual tablet containing the still stronger opioid sufentanil (Dsuvia®).27 
After previously shunning opioids, physicians came to embrace these drugs as 
a quick fix for a complex problem.28 Entirely apart from pressures to keep customers 
satisfied,29 the well-known role of the placebo response makes it imperative that 
physicians have something to offer their patients when complaining of pain.30 As 
nonnarcotic analgesics increasingly moved to over-the-counter (OTC) status, which 
                                                   
on Zohydro, and public health officials in Massachusetts had decided to take more seriously 
concerns about abuse and diversion, especially in light of doubts about the need for yet 
another powerful opioid analgesic.”). 
26 See Alan M. Wolf, Local Cancer Drug Gets FDA OK, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, 
NC), July 17, 2009, at B4 (Onsolis); FDA Backs Pain Reliever from Phoenix Company, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Jan. 7, 2012, at D2 (Subsys); see also Linda Loyd, Fast-Acting Pain Lozenge Is 
Approved, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 26, 2006, at D1. There was also a nasal spray version 
(Lazanda®). Previously approved fentanyl products included transdermal patches 
(Duragesic®) and lollipops (Actiq®). See Noah, supra note 1, at 61–62; Harrison Smith, 
Professor’s Fentanyl Lollipop Helped Cancer Patients Alleviate Severe Pain, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 8, 2017, at B5 (discussing the development of Actiq, which the FDA approved in 1998). 
27 See Lenny Bernstein, Stronger Than Fentanyl, Opioid Gets FDA Approval, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 3, 2018, at A3 (“The drug approved Friday is a 30-microgram pill form of 
sufentanil, a powerful, 34-year-old opioid commonly used after surgery and in emergency 
rooms. Each pill, placed under the tongue for quick absorption, would have the same impact 
as five milligrams of intravenous morphine. Each would come in a plastic applicator that 
looks like a syringe.”). 
28 See David W. Baker, History of The Joint Commission’s Pain Standards: Lessons 
for Today’s Prescription Opioid Epidemic, 317 JAMA 1117, 1117 (2017) (“The Joint 
Commission standards raised concerns that . . . raising pain treatment to a patients’ rights 
issue could lead to overreliance on opioids. . . . Signals appeared suggesting that some 
clinicians had become overzealous in treating pain.”). 
29 See Anna Lembke, Why Doctors Prescribe Opioids to Known Opioid Abusers, 367 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1580, 1581 (2012); Aleksandra Zgierska et al., Patient Satisfaction, 
Prescription Drug Abuse, and Potential Unintended Consequences, 307 JAMA 1377, 1377–
78 (2012); Celine Gounder, Who Is Responsible for the Pain-Pill Epidemic?, NEW YORKER 
(Nov. 8, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/who-is-responsible-for-the-
pain-pill-epidemic [https://perma.cc/N4DM-3556] (“The rise in prescription narcotics may 
have been driven partly by the pharmaceutical industry, but many patients also welcomed—
and encouraged—it. . . . [W]ith a customer-is-always-right mentality having pervaded the 
doctor’s office, patients were able to pressure physicians to satisfy their requests . . . .”); 
Richard Gunderman, When Physicians’ Careers Suffer Because They Refuse to Prescribe 
Narcotics, ATLANTIC (Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/10/ 
when-physicians-careers-suffer-because-they-refuse-to-prescribe-narcotics/280995/ [https: 
//perma.cc/FV57-VR6N]. 
30 See Adam J. Kolber, A Limited Defense of Clinical Placebo Deception, 26 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 75, 76, 89–90 (2007); Noah, supra note 1, at 56 (referring to “the pronounced 
placebo effect that researchers encounter in this context”); see also Gardiner Harris, Study 
Finds Many Doctors Often Give Placebos, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at A12. 
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itself has spawned cavalier use that endangered consumers,31 physicians would need 
something else to prescribe, and insurers preferred picking up the tab for opioids 
over pricier and more time-consuming approaches to pain management.32 
With the growing normalization of the medical use of such powerful narcotics, 
patterns of inexplicable prescribing became commonplace. For instance, one recent 
study found that a quarter of patients seen in hospital emergency departments with 
a sprained ankle received opioid analgesics.33 More importantly, primary care 
physicians have accounted for almost half of opioid prescriptions,34 even though 
                                                   
31 See Lars Noah, Reversal of Fortune: Moving Pharmaceuticals from Over-the-
Counter to Prescription Status?, 63 VILL. L. REV. 355, 356–57, 367–71 (2018). In recent 
research comparing treatments for chronic pain, nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs 
(NSAIDs) performed as well as narcotic analgesics. See Erin E. Krebs et al., Effect of Opioid 
vs Nonopioid Medications on Pain-Related Function in Patients with Chronic Back Pain or 
Hip or Knee Osteoarthritis Pain: The SPACE Randomized Clinical Trial, 319 JAMA 872, 
880–81 (2018); cf. Yngvild Olsen et al., Opioid Prescriptions by U.S. Primary Care 
Physicians from 1992 to 2001, 7 J. PAIN 225, 231 (2006) (wondering what would happen 
after the “market withdrawal of many of the popular COX-2 inhibitor medications [e.g., 
Vioxx® (rofecoxib)] that may previously have been used in lieu of opioids and traditional 
NSAIDs”). 
32 See Barry Meier & Abby Goodnough, Treating Pain Without Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 23, 2016, at B1; Katie Thomas & Charles Ornstein, Insurers Putting Cost over Safety 
with Painkillers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2017, at A1. On the range of methods for managing 
pain, see Lars Noah, Comfortably Numb: Medicalizing (and Mitigating) Pain-and-Suffering 
Damages, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 431, 461–63 (2009). 
33 See M. Kit Delgado et al., National Variation in Opioid Prescribing and Risk of 
Prolonged Use for Opioid-Naive Patients Treated in the Emergency Department for Ankle 
Sprains, 72 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 389, 392 (2018); Rita Rubin, FDA Dispenses Opioid 
Concern; Pills, Patches “Extensively Used,” USA TODAY, Feb. 10, 2009, at D7 (reporting 
that an agency official had identified sprained ankles as an inappropriate use of long-acting 
opioids); see also Maureen V. Hill et al., Wide Variation and Excessive Dosage of Opioid 
Prescriptions for Common General Surgical Procedures, 265 ANNALS SURGERY 709, 711 
(2017) (“[O]pioid pills are greatly over-prescribed for the treatment of acute postoperative 
pain in general surgery patients: over 70% of the prescribed pills were never taken.”); 
Tisamarie B. Sherry et al., Letter, Documented Pain Diagnoses in Adults Prescribed 
Opioids: Results from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey, 2006–2015, 169 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 892, 892–93 (2018) (finding that a pain-related diagnosis did not 
accompany almost 30% of opioid prescriptions, while back pain, arthritis, and other non-
cancer pains accounted for two-thirds of prescriptions). Three-quarters of patients presenting 
with dental pain receive such a prescription. See Catherine Saint Louis, E.R. Doctors Face 
Dilemma on Painkillers, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2012, at D1. 
34 See Benjamin Levy et al., Trends in Opioid Analgesic-Prescribing Rates by 
Specialty, U.S., 2007–2012, 49 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 409, 411 (2015) (concluding that 
“primary care physicians and non-physician prescribers . . . together comprise the source of 
more than half of all opioid analgesic prescriptions”); Jan Hoffman, His Patients in Pain, a 
Doctor Must Limit Their Use of Opioids, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2016, at A1; see also Katie 
Thomas, Doubts Raised About Off-Label Use of a Painkiller, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2014, at 
B1 (“The F.D.A. approved Subsys only for cancer patients who are already using round-the-
clock painkillers, and warned that it should be prescribed only by oncologists and pain 
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they seem particularly ill-equipped to prescribe them in a careful fashion,35 and 
almost one-third of prescriptions issued to adolescents came from dentists.36 As the 
next Part concludes, general practitioners should never have enjoyed such easy 
access to these dangerous controlled substances. 
 
II.  THE FDA’S CENTRAL ROLE AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 
 
Different federal entities have turned their attention to the problems associated 
with the overuse of prescription opioids. Congress has thrown money at the 
problem,37 and it also has enacted various measures,38 most recently the sprawling 
(and cumbersomely titled) Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes 
Opioid Recovery and Treatment (SUPPORT) for Patients and Communities Act.39 
                                                   
specialists. But just 1 percent of prescriptions are written by oncologists . . . . About half of 
the prescriptions were written by pain specialists, and a wide range of doctors prescribed the 
rest, including general practice physicians, neurologists and even dentists and podiatrists.”). 
35 See Joseph R. Schottenfeld et al., Pain and Addiction in Specialty and Primary Care: 
The Bookends of a Crisis, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 220, 220 (2018) (“[O]pioids quickly 
became the treatment of choice to manage chronic pain in the overburdened and 
underresourced context of primary care.”); id. at 223–27 (elaborating); Joanna L. Starrels et 
al., Low Use of Opioid Risk Reduction Strategies in Primary Care Even for High Risk 
Patients with Chronic Pain, 26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 958, 962–63 (2011); Jan Hoffman, 
A Dire Need in Addiction Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2018, at D1 (“[P]rimary care 
providers . . . routinely encounter these patients but often lack the expertise to prevent, diag-
nose and treat addiction. . . . [C]omprehensive addiction training is rare in American medical 
education.”). 
36 See David Armstrong, Prescribing Opioids Ingrained in Dentistry; One 
Practitioner’s Stance Hurts Business, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2017, at A1 (“Dentists have 
become a significant source of opioid prescribing—especially for younger patients 
undergoing wisdom tooth extractions. . . . In many cases, dentists prescribe 20 to 30 tablets 
of a narcotic painkiller, when a patient in all likelihood will only require a handful of pills.”); 
id. (discussing “the pressures dentists face to prescribe potent pain pills, even as research 
shows most of their patients would do just fine with over-the-counter medications such as 
ibuprofen”); see also Alan R. Schroeder et al., Association of Opioid Prescriptions from 
Dental Clinicians for US Adolescents and Young Adults with Subsequent Opioid Use and 
Abuse, 179 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 145 (2019). 
37 See Abby Goodnough, $45 Billion to Fight Opioid Abuse Is Nowhere Near Enough, 
Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2017, at A15 (reporting that Congress had appropriated $1 
billion in 2016 for state treatment programs); Trump Signs Sweeping Opioid Bill, SAN DIEGO 
UNION TRIB., Oct. 25, 2018, at A2 (“Congress has appropriated $8.5 billion for opioid-
related programs this year, but there is no guarantee of additional funding in later years.”). 
38 See, e.g., Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-198, 
130 Stat. 695; cf. Scott Higham & Lenny Bernstein, The Drug Industry’s Triumph over the 
DEA, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2017, at A1 (reporting that Congress had enacted legislation 
weakening the DEA’s enforcement powers). 
39 See Pub. L. No. 115-271, 132 Stat. 3894 (2018). Although a striking feat given low 
expectations about this deliberative body’s ability to accomplish much of anything, some 
public health experts expressed disappointment. See Abby Goodnough, What a Bipartisan 
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Although the White House acted slowly in the face of calls for an emergency 
declaration,40 it has now staked out a fairly hard line in responding to the opioid 
epidemic.41 For its part, the DEA has taken some important steps, including the long-
delayed rescheduling of combination hydrocodone products into Schedule II,42 and 
the reduction of aggregate production quotas,43 while the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services proposed coverage limitations based on the CDC’s prescribing 
guidelines.44 Commentators have suggested a number of other steps that the federal 
government should take, though normally emphasizing the need to coordinate with 
state and local officials.45 
                                                   
Opioid Bill Includes (and Omits), N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2018, at A15 (“The 653-page bill 
contains a mix of law enforcement and public health measures . . . . But addiction experts 
say that while many of the measures will help incrementally, the investment remains meager 
and scattershot compared with what is needed . . . .”); Katie Zezima & Seung Min Kim, 
Trump Signs Bipartisan Opioids Bill, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2018, at A6 (“[E]ven on an issue 
that has prompted an overwhelming desire for action, political considerations soon took 
over. . . . Public health officials say the new law is an important first step toward fighting the 
opioid crisis, but they say it mostly tinkers with the problem rather than addressing it 
directly.”). 
40 See John Wagner et al., Trump Targets Opioid Scourge, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2017, 
at A1. 
41 See Katie Benner, Justice Dept. Intensifies Global War on Opioids, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
23, 2018, at A11; Maggie Haberman et al., Tough Talk, Few Details in President’s Opioid 
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2018, at A19. 
42 See Schedules of Controlled Substances: Rescheduling of Hydrocodone Combination 
Products from Schedule III to Schedule II, 79 Fed. Reg. 49,661, 49,682 (Aug. 22, 2014) 
(codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1308.13(e)(1)); see also David Sell, DEA to Tighten Control of a 
Type of Pain Pill, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 22, 2014, at A17 (“Hydrocodone alone had been a 
Schedule II drug since 1970, when Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act.”). 
43 See Lev Facher, Pressure Builds on the DEA to Stem the Supply of Controlled 
Substances, but at What Cost?, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 25, 2017, at B9 (reporting that, after many 
years of dramatically increasing the aggregate production quotas for opioids, the agency has 
reduced them the last two years); see also Final Adjusted Aggregate Production Quotas for 
Schedule I and II Controlled Substances and Assessment of Annual Needs for the List I 
Chemicals Ephedrine, Pseudoephedrine, and Phenylpropanolamine for 2018, 83 Fed. Reg. 
63,533 (Dec. 10, 2018); Noah, supra note 1, at 63 & n.160 (explaining that, in order to 
pressure Purdue into taking steps to guard against the overuse of OxyContin, the DEA once 
had “threatened to slash the company’s annual production quota by approximately 95 
percent”). The DEA also recently tightened rules that govern how it sets and annually adjusts 
these levels. See Controlled Substances Quotas, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,784, 32,789 (July 16, 2018) 
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1303). 
44 See Jan Hoffman, Greater Pain If Medicare Pulls Back on Opioids, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
28, 2018, at A1. 
45 See, e.g., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G & MED., PAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE 
OPIOID EPIDEMIC: BALANCING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS AND RISKS OF 
PRESCRIPTION OPIOID USE chs. 5–6 (Jonathan K. Phillips et al. eds., 2017); Hilary Homenko, 
Note, Rehabilitating Opioid Regulation: A Prescription for the FDA’s Next Proposal of an 
Opioid Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS), 22 HEALTH MATRIX 273, 303–13 
(2012). 
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This Part will focus on the FDA’s role. In the last few years, that agency has 
solicited public input for how best to address the problems associated with the 
misuse of prescription opioid products,46 though without candidly accepting any real 
responsibility for having unleashed them. The Sections that follow will consider the 
use of labeling and other mechanisms for communicating risk information to 
prescribers and patients, the introduction of abuse-resistant formulations, greater 
reluctance in approving or allowing the continued marketing of these drugs, and 
opportunities for imposing various restrictions on their distribution. If the FDA only 
had the courage to make full use of its power to take that latter course of action (or 
if Congress did so in even more draconian ways), then we might stand some chance 
of ending this country’s addiction to prescription opioids as well as guarding against 
the next scourge of this type. 
 
A.  Misguided Reliance on Messaging 
 
OxyContin created problems primarily because of what Purdue Pharma said 
about its drug. Older oxycodone drugs long predated it, and the extended-release 
formulation initially did not appear to make it particularly hazardous (though the 
higher dose of the active ingredient in each tablet made it marginally more attractive 
for diversion). Instead, Purdue’s ability to pitch their version as nonaddictive—as 
well as less prone to abuse and diversion—helped make otherwise cautious 
physicians more willing to prescribe it.47 
                                                   
46 See, e.g., Request for Comments, Opioid Policy Steering Committee, 82 Fed. Reg. 
45,597, 45,599–600 (Sept. 29, 2017); Notice of Public Workshop and Request for 
Comments, Data and Methods for Evaluating the Impact of Opioid Formulations with 
Properties Designed to Deter Abuse in the Postmarket Setting: A Scientific Discussion of 
Present and Future Capabilities, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,271, 27,272 (June 14, 2017); see also Robert 
M. Califf et al., A Proactive Response to Prescription Opioid Abuse, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1480 (2016) (discussing the FDA’s planned initiatives); id. at 1483 (“Until clinicians stop 
prescribing opioids far in excess of clinical need, this crisis will continue unabated.”); cf. 
Chris McGreal, FDA’s Opioids Adviser Accuses Agency of Having “Direct” Link to Crisis, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jan/24/fda-opioids-
big-pharma-prescriptions [https://perma.cc/Y9N2-N3VP] (“[Raeford] Brown, an 
anesthesiologist who chairs the FDA committee of specialists advising the agency on 
whether to approve new opioid painkillers, said he no longer had confidence in repeated 
assurances by the FDA leadership that it was taking the epidemic seriously and prepared to 
put public health above the commercial interests of drug makers.”). 
47 See Barry Meier, Owners Tied to Plan to Hide OxyContin Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
2019, at B1 (“Company sales representatives told doctors that OxyContin couldn’t be abused 
and were trained to say that the drug had an addiction risk for patients of ‘less than one 
percent,’ a claim that had no scientific backing.”). More recently, Insys Therapeutics, the 
manufacturer of the fentanyl product Subsys, got caught bribing physicians. See Lars Noah, 
Doctors on the Take: Aligning Tort Law to Address Drug Company Payments to Prescribers, 
66 BUFF. L. REV. 855, 867–68 & nn.36–37 (2018); Nishant Mohan, Insys Therapeutics to 
Settle with U.S., WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2018, at B3; see also Scott E. Hadland et al., Industry 
Payments to Physicians for Opioid Products, 2013–2015, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1493, 
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Initially, the FDA authorized Purdue to make such claims in the labeling for 
OxyContin and, by extension, in the company’s advertising to health care 
professionals. Only belatedly did the agency come to appreciate that the assertions 
about a lower propensity for addictiveness or diversion lacked any real foundation.48 
In 2001, responding to emerging patterns of irresponsible prescribing, the FDA 
demanded that OxyContin’s professional labeling add a black-box warning.49 This 
represented part of a risk-management plan that also included a mechanism for 
tracking suspected sources of diversion, educating physicians, and supplying special 
prescription pads.50 In 2016, the agency demanded that immediate-release opioids 
add black-box warnings that it had ordered for all extended-release versions three 
years earlier.51 
                                                   
1494 (2017) (finding that one out of twelve physicians had received payments from sellers 
of opioids during the study period, totaling over $46 million); Abby Goodnough, Study Links 
Opioid Makers’ Gifts for Doctors to Higher Overdose Death Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 
2019, at B3. 
48 See Carrie Johnson, OxyContin Makers Admit Deception; Addiction Danger from 
Painkiller Was Understated, WASH. POST, May 11, 2007, at A1 (“From 1996 to 2001, Purdue 
claimed that the ‘miracle drug’ was safer than rival medications despite repeated studies that 
suggested patients had developed a risk of abuse and had serious trouble withdrawing from 
OxyContin.”). Indeed, precisely the opposite seems to have happened. See Harriet Ryan et 
al., OxyContin’s 12-Hour Problem; It Fades Hours Early in Many Patients, Increasing Their 
Risk of Addiction, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 2016, at A1. 
49 See Josh White, More Warnings About OxyContin; FDA, Drugmaker Advise Caution 
in Prescribing Addictive Painkiller, WASH. POST, July 26, 2001, at B2 (explaining that this 
also entailed having Purdue mail out 800,000 letters to physicians in order to draw attention 
to this labeling revision); see also Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the 
“Right to Know” from the “Need to Know” About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. 
ON REG. 293, 360 (1994) (discussing the FDA’s use of “Dear Doctor” letters designed to 
draw attention to such new risk information). Such efforts do not, however, seem to do much 
good. See, e.g., Walter Smalley et al., Contraindicated Use of Cisapride: Impact of Food 
and Drug Administration Regulatory Action, 284 JAMA 3036, 3039 (2000). An entirely 
different type of “Dear Doctor” letter, issued by the local medical examiner’s office, appears 
to have more of an impact. See Jason N. Doctor et al., Opioid Prescribing Decreases After 
Learning of a Patient’s Fatal Overdose, 361 SCIENCE 588, 588–89 (2018); cf. Carolyn Y. 
Johnson, Sales Pitch Has Doses of Evidence and Caution, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2019, at A1 
(discussing counterdetailing efforts).  
50 See Mathews & Abboud, supra note 18, at A3; see also U.S. CONG., GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: OXYCONTIN ABUSE AND DIVERSION AND 
EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM, No. GAO-04-110 (2003). Although Purdue became 
increasingly suspicious of diversion by particular physicians, clinics, and pharmacies, the 
company apparently failed to share this information with the DEA in a timely fashion. See 
Harriet Ryan et al., More Than 1 Million OxyContin Pills Ended up in the Hands of Criminals 
and Addicts. What the Drugmaker Knew, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2016, at A1. 
51 See Lenny Bernstein, New Labels on Opioids Will Warn of Risks of Addiction, 
Overdose, Death, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2016, at A19; see also Laurie McGinley, FDA 
Requires New Warnings on Dangers of Mixing Drugs, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2016, at A12 
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Apart from communicating enhanced risk information, the government took 
further steps to limit the favorable pitches that Purdue could make.52 By 2008, the 
FDA directed the company to cease claiming that OxyContin posed only a small risk 
of addiction in patients.53 Meanwhile, the Justice Department brought misbranding 
prosecutions, and Purdue paid $600 million to settle lawsuits brought by numerous 
parties after pleading guilty to felony charges for fraudulently asserting that 
OxyContin was less prone to abuse.54 In 2018, belatedly attempting to counteract 
decades of criticism about its promotional practices, the company announced that it 
would cease all marketing campaigns directed to physicians.55 In fact, some 
commentators have suggested imposing a blanket prohibition on the advertising of 
opioids,56 but any such move would surely run afoul of the First Amendment.57 
 
                                                   
(reporting that soon thereafter the agency mandated black-box warnings to emphasize the 
serious risks associated with using opioids in combination with benzodiazepines). 
52 See, e.g., Chris Adams, FDA Asks Maker of OxyContin to Pull “Misleading” Print 
Ads, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2003, at D3 (reporting that the agency sent Purdue “an unusually 
harsh letter” objecting to advertisements that the company had run in JAMA because they 
“underplayed the most serious risks”). 
53 See Whoriskey, supra note 14, at A1 (“The FDA did not say what evidence led the 
agency to allow the previous claims or what new findings led it to ask for the removal of 
those claims.”). In contrast, the FDA’s decision in 2015 to approve pediatric labeling for the 
drug, which promised an additional period of market exclusivity, triggered howls of protest. 
See Brady Dennis, OxyContin for Kids Evokes Fierce Feelings, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2015, 
at A3; Catherine Saint Louis, F.D.A. Approval of OxyContin Use for Children Continues to 
Draw Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2015, at A20. 
54 See United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 572–73, 576 (W.D. 
Va. 2007) (accepting plea agreements by the company as well as three high-ranking 
corporate officers each of whom received sentences of three years of probation and together 
paid $34.5 million in fines); see also Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813, 828 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (reversing orders that excluded these officers from participating in federal health care 
programs). 
55 See Ben Poston, Opioid Maker Limits Sales Efforts; Under Pressure over Addiction 
Crisis, Purdue Pharma Will No Longer Promote Its Painkillers to Doctors, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
11, 2018, at A1. 
56 See Andrew Kolodny & Thomas R. Frieden, Ten Steps the Federal Government 
Should Take Now to Reverse the Opioid Addiction Epidemic, 318 JAMA 1537, 1537 (2017) 
(recommending that the FDA narrow the “labeling for chronic pain and greatly restrict or 
eliminate marketing of opioids for this indication”); see also Bruce Psaty & Joseph O. 
Merrill, Addressing the Opioid Epidemic—Opportunities in the Postmarketing Setting, 376 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1502, 1503 (2017) (“If it’s not clear that the FDA has the authority to 
limit the off-label marketing of controlled substances, Congress could expand the agency’s 
authority to modify what has been one of the main drivers of the opioid epidemic.”). 
57 See Lars Noah, Truth or Consequences?: Commercial Free Speech vs. Public Health 
Promotion (at the FDA), 21 HEALTH MATRIX 31, 67–68, 72–84 (2011); see also id. at 87 
(explaining that, until 2001, the agency followed a policy of disallowing direct-to-consumer 
advertising for Schedule II drugs). 
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B.  The False Promise of Technological Fixes 
 
In recently enacting the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, 
Congress made essentially no changes to the FDA’s statutory authority, preferring 
instead to call on the agency to hold public meetings and issue guidance documents 
on particular issues related to opioids in the hopes that it would take a hint.58 The 
one modification related to the FDA’s delegated powers would allow it to dictate 
special packaging for narcotic analgesics as well as other hazardous drugs.59 Entirely 
apart from the fact it had managed to impose such restrictions under the enabling 
statute before this minor amendment,60 and already had planned to do so for 
opioids,61 requiring that such products get dispensed in blister packs containing only 
a few doses hardly seems like the silver bullet needed to combat this problem. 
Nonetheless, it aligns quite nicely with the growing search for technological 
solutions to prescription opioid abuse.62 
Within five years of OxyContin’s introduction, Purdue began work on an 
abuse-resistant formulation.63 Originally, the company considered adding a 
                                                   
58 See Pub. L. No. 115-271, §§ 3001–3002, 132 Stat. 3894, 3932–34 (2018); id. 
§ 3041(c), 132 Stat. at 3943. A couple of years earlier, members of the Senate used a 
confirmation process in an effort to get the agency’s attention. See Sabrina Tavernise, F.D.A. 
Chief Is Confirmed After Debate on Painkillers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2016, at A11. 
59 See Pub. L. No. 115-271, § 3031, 132 Stat. at 3940–41 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355-1(e)(4)). Separately, the grant of recall authority specific to these drugs, see id. § 3012, 
132 Stat. at 3935–36 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb–8d), seems like an odd way of 
responding to their well understood (as opposed to newly emergent) hazards, though it might 
well increase the agency’s leverage in securing concessions from opioid manufacturers. 
60 See, e.g., Noah, supra note 31, at 375 (explaining that the FDA recently “asked 
manufacturers [of loperamide] to adopt more cumbersome blister packs for each dose and 
include only enough doses for short-term use” to address the newly discovered abuse 
potential of this nonprescription antidiarrheal drug); see also Andrew Schneider, Banned 
Pesticide Allowed as Medicine; U.S. Bars Lindane, Except to Treat Lice, BALT. SUN, Aug. 
14, 2006, at 1A (reporting that the agency ordered the manufacturer of this pediculocide to 
warn physicians against prescribing more than enough for a single application); cf. 
Nutritional Health Alliance v. FDA, 318 F.3d 92, 100–04 (2d Cir. 2003) (invalidating an 
FDA requirement that higher dose iron supplements use blister packs to guard against 
accidental poisoning in children because the authority to impose packaging restrictions for 
such purposes resided with a different agency). 
61 See David Crow, FDA Eyes Cut in Prescriptions to Help Contain Opioids Crisis; US 
Regulator Seeks to Limit Exposure; Doctors to Face “Additional Hoops,” FIN. TIMES, Dec. 
12, 2017, at 11. 
62 Cf. Tamara Mathias, U.S. Regulators Snip Red Tape for Medical Devices to Curb 
Opioid Crisis, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www. reuters.com/article/usa-opioids/rpt-
focus-us-regulators-snip-red-tape-for-medical-devices-to-curb-opioid-crisis-idUSL2N1XJ 
1NE [tps://perma.cc/6N3Q-VUFL] (“Although the FDA contest is limited to devices and 
app-based solutions for pain and addiction, the current regulatory climate is also conducive 
to companies developing opioid-alternative pharmaceuticals.”). 
63 See Barry Meier, U.S. Asks Painkiller Maker to Help Curb Wide Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 1, 2001, at A16; see also Linda Loyd, Against Opioid Abuse, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 3, 
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sequestered opioid antagonist (such as naltrexone) that could counteract the 
oxycodone when crushed.64 Ultimately, Purdue decided to harden the tablets by 
infusing them with a polymer.65 In 2010, more than two years after submitting an 
application for this reformulation to the FDA, the sponsor secured approval for 
OxyContin OP®.66 Then, on the very day that Purdue’s initial patents expired, the 
agency announced that the company had withdrawn its original formulation of 
OxyContin on safety grounds.67 
                                                   
2016, at E1 (explaining that the FDA has encouraged the development of abuse-resistant 
formulations of other opioids). 
64 See Barry Meier, Maker Chose Not to Use a Drug Abuse Safeguard: Company Says 
It Didn’t Anticipate Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2001, at A11 (adding that other 
manufacturers previously had done so for opioid analgesics with a lower abuse potential, 
including the addition of naloxone to Talwin® (pentazocine) in 1983). Along similar lines, 
some had suggested including a chemical irritant such as capsaicin that would make a 
crushed tablet unpleasant to snort or otherwise consume. See Sandra Blakeslee, Drug Makers 
Hope to Kill the Kick in Pain Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2004, at F1 (adding that 
manufacturers of paregoric, an old liquid opiate formulation, had responded to its abuse by 
adding camphor to trigger a gag reflex, which led abusers simply to boil off that ingredient). 
65 See Timothy W. Martin, OxyContin Maker Guards Exclusivity, WALL ST. J., June 
28, 2012, at A1 (“The new version of the pill is infused with polyethylene oxide, a polymer 
that makes the pill tough to crush for snorting or to heat for intravenous injection. The 
company also altered the formula so that the pill’s powdery contents turn into a jellylike 
substance if water is added to make a solution for an injection.”); id. (“Users can still get 
high from the pills if they are willing to swallow enough of them or engage in more elaborate 
processing.”). 
66 See Abby Goodnough & Katie Zezima, Drug Is Harder to Abuse, but Users 
Persevere, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, at A21; see also Lisa Girion, FDA Approves Recast 
Painkiller; Experts Are Wary of a Drug Called a Less-Addictive Form of OxyContin, L.A. 
TIMES, July 24, 2014, at AA1 (“Purdue Pharma’s Targiniq ER combines a long-acting form 
of the opioid analgesic oxycodone with the medication naloxone, which is commonly used 
to reverse the effects of an opioid overdose. . . . The naloxone becomes active when the pills 
are crushed.”); id. (“Dr. Andrew Kolodny, president of Physicians for Responsible Opioid 
Prescribing, said the FDA’s approval of Targiniq could ‘exacerbate this crisis.’ If doctors 
believe Targiniq is safe, they may be more inclined to prescribe it instead of seeking 
alternatives . . . . ‘Coming up with new gimmicks isn’t going to help.’”). 
67 See Notice, Determination That the OXYCONTIN (Oxycodone Hydrochloride) 
Drug Products Covered by New Drug Application 20-553 Were Withdrawn from Sale for 
Reasons of Safety or Effectiveness, 78 Fed. Reg. 23,273 (Apr. 18, 2013); see also Noah, 
supra note 18, at 175–79 (discussing anticompetitive concerns with this maneuver). Shortly 
thereafter, the FDA rejected a similar request from Endo Pharmaceuticals after that company 
introduced a reformulated version of its ER oxymorphone product Opana because the agency 
found the new drug no better at deterring abuse. See id. at 176 n.52; see also infra note 82 
and accompanying text (discussing its subsequent withdrawal). 
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Other opioid analgesics now incorporate abuse-resistant features.68 Some 
observers have questioned the utility of such reformulations.69 In the case of 
OxyContin, however, the effort seemed to work, but researchers found that this 
simply drove abusers to substitute heroin and resulted in no net reduction in overdose 
deaths.70 Indeed, before OxyContin came along, few companies marketed single-
ingredient oxycodone or other opioid products;71 instead, they previously had 
included aspirin, acetaminophen, or ibuprofen, which amounted to nonnarcotic 
“impurities” from the perspective of abusers.72 In a sense, then, the agency’s 
willingness to approve a variety of single-ingredient opioids over the last two 
decades unwittingly removed an abuse-resistant feature of the older formulations. 
                                                   
68 See, e.g., Bradley J. Fikes, Painkiller Unit Sold for $100M Upfront; San Diego-Based 
Zogenix to Use Proceeds for Other Drug Trials, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 11, 2015, at 
C1 (noting the reformulation of Zohydro to resist abuse); Lisa Girion, Powerful Painkiller 
Approved, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2014, at A8 (reporting that the FDA approved Purdue’s 
third abuse-resistant opioid, the once-a-day hydrocodone drug Hysingla ER® containing 
more than twice the dosage of Zohydro); see also Notice of Availability, Guidance for 
Industry, Abuse-Deterrent Opioids—Evaluation and Labeling, 80 Fed. Reg. 17,765 (Apr. 2, 
2015); Timothy W. Martin & Jonathan D. Rockoff, Race Accelerates for Safer Painkiller, 
WALL ST. J., May 6, 2013, at B1 (explaining that the push for abuse-resistant formulations 
offered brand-name manufacturers a lucrative new business opportunity). 
69 See William C. Becker & David A. Fiellin, Abuse-Deterrent Opioid Formulations—
Putting the Potential Benefits into Perspective, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2103 (2017); Pamela 
Leece et al., Tamper-Resistant Drugs Cannot Solve the Opioid Crisis, 187 CAN. MED. ASS’N 
J. 717 (2015).  
70 See Theodore J. Cicero et al., Letter, Effect of Abuse-Deterrent Formulation of 
OxyContin, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 187, 189 (2012); Harriet Ryan, OxyContin Shift Tied to 
Heroin Deaths; “Abuse-Deterrent” Pain Pills Inadvertently Helped Fuel a Rise in Fatal 
Overdoses of the Street Drug, Study Says, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2017, at A7. 
71 See Noah, supra note 25, at 4–5 (“Hydrocodone when used as the sole active 
ingredient had always faced Schedule II controls, which may help to explain why no 
company had ever before [Zohydro’s approval in 2013] commercialized such a product.” 
(footnote omitted)); Klaus T. Olkkola & Nora M. Hagelberg, Oxycodone: New “Old” Drug, 
22 CURRENT OPINION ANESTHESIOLOGY 459, 459 (2009) (“Before the 1990s, for instance in 
the United States of America and Canada, oxycodone was mainly consumed in combination 
preparations combined with antipyretic analgesics.”); see also Single-Ingredient, Immediate-
Release Drug Products Containing Oxycodone for Oral Administration and Labeled for 
Human Use; Enforcement Action Dates, 77 Fed. Reg. 40,069, 40,070 (July 6, 2012) 
(mentioning a couple of more recently approved single-ingredient oxycodone products). 
72 See Blakeslee, supra note 64, at F1 (reporting that OxyContin abusers “liked the fact 
that the drugs were pure”); see also John Fauber & Ellen Gabler, FDA to Weigh Tighter 
Restrictions on Vicodin: Addiction, Overdose Deaths Rising in U.S., MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, Jan. 23, 2013, at A1 (“FDA researchers concluded that one of the reasons hydro-
codone products were less likely to be abused than drugs such as oxycodone was because all 
hydrocodone products are combined with over-the-counter pain relievers . . . [which] reduces 
the amount of hydrocodone needed . . . .”). 
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Whether or not they deter abuse, the latest reformulations do absolutely nothing to 
reduce the risk of addiction.73 
Similarly, various countermeasures now exist to manage opioid overuse, which 
some critics have assailed for serving to facilitate continued misuse.74 For instance, 
in the last two decades, the FDA approved Movantik® (naloxegol) to treat opioid-
induced constipation,75 a nasal spray formulation of the opiate antagonist Narcan® 
(naloxone) as an antidote for overdose,76 and Suboxone® (high-dose buprenorphine 
combined with naloxone to deter abuse) for maintenance treatment of addicts.77 
                                                   
73 See Alan Schwarz, Painkillers Resist Abuse, but Experts Still Worry: Inventive 
Addicts Thwart Safeguards, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2015, at A16 (“[T]he active ingredients in 
abuse-deterrent drugs provide the same high and remain just as addictive as in regular 
formulations.”); id. (“[M]any misunderstand the persistent risks, said Dr. G. Caleb 
Alexander, a co-director of the Center for Drug Safety and Effectiveness at the Johns 
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. A national survey of internists, family 
physicians and general practitioners that [he] led last year found that . . . almost half of those 
doctors thought that abuse-deterrent pills were inherently less addictive.”); see also Lewis S. 
Nelson et al., Editorial, Addressing the Opioid Epidemic, 314 JAMA 1453, 1453 (2015) 
(“New opioid medications, many of them with tamper-resistant formulations, continue to be 
marketed despite the lack of evidence that these preparations reduce the risk of addiction.”). 
74 See Ariana Eunjung Cha, An Industry’s Answer to Deadly Opioid Addiction: More 
Pills, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2016, at A1 (“[E]ach of these submarkets—addiction, overdose 
and side effects—is worth at least $1 billion a year in sales. These economics, experts say, 
work against efforts to end the epidemic.”); id. (“By promoting opioid-induced constipation 
as a condition in need of more targeted treatment, critics say the drug industry is creating 
incentives to maintain the painkillers at full strength and add another pill instead.”); 
Katharine Q. Seelye, A Lifesaver for Heroin Users, but No Cure for an Epidemic, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 31, 2016, at A14 (“Critics say that [Narcan] gives drug users a safety net, 
allowing them to take more risks as they seek higher highs.”). 
75 See Cha, supra note 74, at A1 (reporting that the FDA approved the drug in 2014 and 
a competing product (Relistor®) two years later); see also Matt Pearce, What a Super Bowl 
Ad Didn’t Say; Pharmaceutical Firms That Funded the Spot on Opioid-Induced 
Constipation Are Criticized for Not Mentioning Addiction, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2016, at A6 
(discussing controversy related to consumer ads for this drug to treat a common side effect 
of opioid use). 
76 See Sabrina Tavernise, F.D.A. Approves a Nasal Spray to Combat Opioid Overdose, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2015, at A20; see also Bridget M. Kuehn, Easy-to-Use Overdose 
Antidote Earns Fast-Track Approval, 311 JAMA 1600, 1600 (2014) (discussing Evzio®, an 
autoinjector that represented “the first FDA-approved naloxone product designed for use by 
nonclinicians”); Max Blau, The Next Naloxone?; Companies, Academics Search for Better 
Overdose-Reversal Drugs, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 16, 2018, at B8 (reporting that, given the 
challenges posed by far more powerful synthetic opioids, Opiant Pharmaceuticals is 
developing a nasal spray formulation of nalmefene, which the FDA had approved in 1995 as 
an injectable drug (Revex®) but the manufacturer discontinued in 2008 because of 
insufficient demand). 
77 See Brian Mund & Kate Stith, Buprenorphine MAT as an Imperfect Fix, 46 J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS 279, 281 (2018); see also id. at 279–86 (explaining the downsides of 
buprenorphine as a treatment for addiction, and concluding that physician training 
requirements and other existing limitations on its prescribing remain necessary). Other 
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Even though it seems unlikely that the availability of such products would make 
physicians and patients more willing to take greater chances with incautious opioid 
use,78 their approval may work to salve the FDA’s conscience about allowing contin-
ued easy access to a variety of opioid analgesics.79 
 
C.  Just Say No: Nonapproval or License Withdrawal 
 
As cataloged earlier, the FDA’s profligacy in approving new opioids has hardly 
abated,80 though perhaps its willingness to do so has finally plateaued. For instance, 
the agency recently rejected an application for an immediate-release oxycodone 
product, though primarily because it found inadequate evidence that the inclusion of 
a dye would justify labeling the proposed product as abuse-deterrent.81 In 2017, at 
the FDA’s urging, Endo withdrew its reformulated version of Opana from the 
market, though primarily because abusers no longer able to snort it would liquefy 
the drug for injection, which the added inactive ingredients may have made more 
hazardous,82 and the sharing of hypodermic needles had caused localized outbreaks 
                                                   
formulations that dispense with naloxone (and do not come as a sublingual strip) include 
Subutex® (sublingual tablet), Probuphine® (subdermal implant that lasts six months), and 
Sublocade® (monthly injection). See id. at 281, 286, 289 n.101; Laurie McGinley, FDA 
Approves First Implantable Drug for the Treatment of Opioid Addiction, WASH. POST, May 
27, 2016, at A3; see also Brendan Saloner et al., Moving Addiction Care to the Mainstream—
Improving the Quality of Buprenorphine Treatment, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED. 4 (2018).  
78 See Nick Werle & Ernesto Zedillo, We Can’t Go Cold Turkey: Why Suppressing 
Drug Markets Endangers Society, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 325, 333 (2018) (“Opponents 
claimed that reducing overdose risk through naloxone access would encourage injection drug 
use and would discourage entry to abstinence-based treatments. However, numerous studies 
have disproven these assertions applying deterrence theory to naloxone access.”); cf. Lars 
Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedical 
Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 654–55 (2003) (“[T]he introduction of selective [embryo] 
reduction offers an apparent fix for high-order multifetal pregnancies, which in turn may 
encourage [fertility] patients and providers to gamble with more aggressive and risky 
interventions.”). 
79 Recently, a pair of FDA advisory committees recommended revisions in the labeling 
of narcotic analgesics to encourage routine co-prescribing of naloxone. See Lenny Bernstein, 
Panels: Prescribe Opioid Antidote with Painkillers, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2018, at A11. 
80 See supra notes 21–27 and accompanying text. 
81 See Denial of Hearing Request Regarding Proposal to Refuse to Approve a New Drug 
Application for Oxycodone Hydrochloride Immediate-Release Abuse-Deterrent 
Formulation, Oral Capsules, 5 Milligrams, 15 Milligrams, and 30 Milligrams; Order 
Refusing Approval, 83 Fed. Reg. 54,598, 54,600–03 (Oct. 30, 2018); id. at 54,600 n.9 
(calling this deficiency “the primary focus of this order”); id. at 54,602–03 (declining to 
address broader policy questions); see also id. at 54,599 (summarizing other deficiencies in 
the application). 
82 See id. at 54,601 n.14 (“[P]ostmarket data showed a significant shift in the route of 
abuse from nasal to injection following the product’s reformulation . . . [, which has] been 
associated with serious adverse events, including numerous cases of thrombotic 
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of HIV and hepatitis C.83 In 2005, Purdue’s extended-release hydromorphone 
product (Palladone®) spent less than a year on the market before its withdrawal, but 
that happened because it posed potentially fatal risks to users if consumed with 
alcohol.84 The agency still seems hesitant, however, to consider collateral effects 
such as propensity for misuse in making licensing judgments. 
Commentators have urged the FDA to take such a broader view when assessing 
the safety of opioids and other drugs prone to abuse.85 The agency had tried doing 
so several decades ago with methadone, only to have the federal courts invalidate its 
effort.86 Although subsequent statutory amendments appear to grant the FDA greater 
authority to consider factors other than a product’s intrinsic safety when prescribed 
to patients for an intended use, the agency seemingly remains cautious about doing 
                                                   
microangiopathy which are thought to have been related to injection of the excipients 
included to deter abuse.”). 
83 See Scott Gottlieb & Janet Woodcock, Marshaling FDA Benefit-Risk Expertise to 
Address the Current Opioid Abuse Epidemic, 318 JAMA 421, 421–22 (2017); Jeanne 
Whalen, Painkiller Is Pulled from U.S. Market, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2017, at A3 (“[T]he 
agency called [this] its first effort to remove an opioid pain drug from the market over abuse 
concerns.”). 
84 See Marc Kaufman, Painkiller Palladone Pulled over Alcohol Risk, WASH. POST, 
July 14, 2005, at A14. In 2010, the FDA finally ordered the withdrawal of propoxyphene 
(e.g., Darvon®), which it first approved in 1957, because of its association with heart rhythm 
abnormalities. See In re Darvocet, Darvon & Propoxyphene Prod. Liab. Litig., 756 F.3d 917, 
923–24 (6th Cir. 2014); Duff Wilson, Painkiller to Be Pulled off Market, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
20, 2010, at B1. In contrast, the agency previously had tried to address longstanding concerns 
about addiction to this weaker (Schedule IV) opioid with the addition of ineffectual 
warnings. See Thomas J. Moore et al., Time to Act on Drug Safety, 279 JAMA 1571, 1572 
(1998) (“[N]ew warnings about the addictive properties of propoxyphene had no effect on 
either prescription volume or the number of overdose deaths.”). 
85 See Patricia J. Zettler et al., Implementing a Public Health Perspective in FDA Drug 
Regulation, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 221, 223–24, 235–41, 255–56 (2018); cf. Noah, supra 
note 1, at 56 (“[S]uch regulatory actions—whether expressed as a refusal to allow an 
analgesic product to enter the market initially or the withdrawal of such a product in the face 
of rampant abuse—would have to grapple with the classic difficulty of choosing between the 
medical needs of individual patients and the broader societal hazards associated with the 
availability of such products.”); id. at 64 (“[L]icensing decisions should not reflect an 
excessive preoccupation with the potential for abuse unless the products genuinely have no 
value as therapeutic interventions.”). 
86 See Am. Pharm. Ass’n v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 824, 828–31 (D.D.C. 1974) 
(invalidating the FDA’s effort to limit the dispensing of methadone because the standard for 
drug approval relates only to a drug’s intrinsic safety when used as directed and also because 
Congress had assigned responsibility to restrict the distribution of controlled substances to 
the DEA), aff’d per curiam sub nom. Am. Pharm. Ass’n v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1054 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976); see also Mathews, 530 F.2d at 1055 (McGowan, J., concurring) (“[M]ethadone 
is safe for its intended use notwithstanding the possibility that it will be employed in unin-
tended fashions.”); Ass’n Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. FDA, 226 F. Supp. 2d 204, 
216–18 (D.D.C. 2002) (interpreting the methadone decision as limiting the agency’s ability 
to evaluate the safety of unintended uses of drugs even when not subject to DEA controls). 
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so given the all-or-nothing judgment involved in licensure.87 As the next Section 
explains, risk-management tools more aggressive than stern directions in the 
approved labeling but less draconian than nonapproval offer an intermediate option 
for addressing concerns about irresponsible prescribing practices and misuse by 
patients.88 
 
D.  Failures to Impose Radical Distribution Controls 
 
In previous work, I have called for restrictions on the types of health care 
professionals entitled to prescribe drugs prone to inappropriate use,89 including 
                                                   
87 See Bernstein, supra note 27, at A3 (“FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb issued an 
unusual statement saying he would seek more authority for the agency to consider whether 
there are too many similar drugs on the market, which might allow the agency to turn down 
future applications for new opioid approvals. . . . [A]gency critics and some public officials 
have clamored for a holistic approach to narcotic painkillers, instead of the FDA’s practice 
of evaluating each opioid application on its own.”); see also id. (adding that, “[i]ncluding 
brand name and generic drugs, there are nearly 400 opioids on the market”). 
88 See Noah, supra note 1, at 56 (“Providing more refined regulatory options may allow 
for a more sensible resolution of the perennial tension between patient access and drug 
diversion.”); id. at 64 (“[T]he [FDA] may have placed excessive faith in the good sense of 
physicians and the power of labeling to encourage proper use and to limit the occasions for 
inappropriate prescribing.”); cf. Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the 
Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 
437–40 & n.290 (2002) (explaining that the agency has lost some of its confidence in the 
willingness of health care professionals to pay attention to important labeling information); 
id. at 440 (“FDA officials openly chastised physicians for disregarding instructions in the 
labeling for newly approved drugs, and they warned that the agency might have to become 
more cautious in approving medical technologies because physicians seemed incapable of 
following directions.”); id. at 462 (concluding that “it makes little sense for the courts to 
disregard what may be the most evidence-based of all practice guidelines just because 
doctors habitually ignore them”). 
89 See Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the Practice 
of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 188–89 (2004). 
 
One particularly controversial risk management strategy would allow only a 
limited group of medical specialists to prescribe certain especially hazardous 
drugs. After all, with the ever-expanding number and complexity of 
pharmaceutical treatments, general practitioners find it difficult to stay informed 
of appropriate interventions for different conditions, and they may find it even 
more difficult to resist the demands made by patients who have seen a product 
advertised for what ails them. The result may be indiscriminate prescribing of 
powerful therapeutic agents. Moreover, if states increasingly allow non-
physicians to prescribe drugs, the FDA may have to rethink its broad deference to 
state licensing judgments and respond by imposing such special restrictions more 
frequently or even by creating different classes of prescription drugs. 
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opioid analgesics.90 Although the FDA enjoyed no statutory authority to impose 
such controls at the time, it had successfully persuaded manufacturers of particularly 
hazardous nonnarcotic drugs to accept restrictions on distribution as a condition of 
continued licensure.91 As elaborated below, Congress delegated explicit power to 
impose such restrictions more than a decade ago, but the agency has made only 
feeble attempts to use these tools to crack down on the inappropriate prescribing of 
opioid analgesics. 
Approved treatments for persons addicted to opioids face additional restrictions 
on access by virtue of special federal legislation. In 1974, Congress mandated that 
physicians would have to secure a separate registration from the DEA before 
dispensing any controlled substance for the purposes of detoxification (short-term) 
or maintenance (long-term) treatment of opiate-dependent individuals.92 At the time, 
only the Schedule II drug methadone served this purpose, and only clinics accredited 
as opioid treatment programs by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration (SAMHSA) could dispense the drug. Physicians could, however, 
                                                   
Id. at 190–91 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 189–90 (identifying several prescription 
drugs already subject to special distribution restrictions). As I explained at length in that 
article, the Constitution would not stand in the way of doing so. See id. at 158–71; see also 
id. at 168 (“Congress has chosen to leave matters of medicine to the states, which in turn 
have chosen to leave these matters largely to professional self-regulation. Nothing in the 
Constitution requires that doctors be given such a wide berth.”); id. at 193 (“[E]fforts to 
protect patients by limiting the distribution of hazardous prescription drugs should not 
founder on an exaggerated preoccupation with the rights of either states or physicians.”). 
90 See Noah, supra note 1, at 64 (“[T]he government might limit access to those medical 
specialists who usually encounter persons suffering severe or chronic pain—including, for 
instance, oncologists and orthopedic surgeons along with pain specialists—in the hopes that 
such specialists would better resist the tendency to prescribe Schedule II analgesics for 
patients for whom milder agents would work equally well.”); cf. id. (conceding, however, 
that “this would risk creating serious access problems for legitimate patients, at least if the 
range of specialists was defined too narrowly”); id. at 63 (elaborating on this concern). 
91 See Lars Noah, Governance by the Backdoor: Administrative Law(lessness?) at the 
FDA, 93 NEB. L. REV. 89, 132–36 (2014); Scott Gottlieb, Opinion, Prescription for Trouble, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2007, at A19 (explaining that risk-management plans “already guide 
the use of about 30 marketed drugs as part of ‘voluntary’ arrangements with drug 
companies”); cf. Anna Wilde Mathews & Gary Fields, Federal Agencies Seek to Curb Abuse 
of Potent Painkillers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2003, at B1 (“The FDA has never limited any 
opioid to certain pharmacies, and agency officials say they don’t have the authority to block 
certain physicians from prescribing a drug.”). 
92 See Narcotic Addict Treatment Act of 1974 (NATA), Pub. L. No. 93-281, § 3, 88 
Stat. 124, 124–25 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 823(g)); see also Stephen P. Molinari 
et al., Federal Regulation of Clinical Practice in Narcotic Addiction Treatment: Purpose, 
Status, and Alternatives, 22 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 231, 238 (1994) (“The NATA has created 
a closed distribution system unique to pharmacotherapy and the practice of medicine.”). See 
generally INST. OF MED., FEDERAL REGULATION OF METHADONE TREATMENT (Richard A. 
Rettig & Adam Yarmolinsky eds., 1995). 
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continue to freely prescribe methadone for pain relief.93 In 2000, Congress 
authorized waivers of these registration and dispensing requirements for drugs 
residing in a lower schedule.94 A couple of years later, the FDA approved the 
Schedule III drug buprenorphine (e.g., Suboxone) for use in treating opioid use 
disorder.95 
In order to qualify for a waiver, physicians interested in prescribing 
buprenorphine could complete eight hours of special training (unless they already 
had certain specialty certifications or experience), secure a certificate from 
SAMHSA subject to annual renewal, and, after a limit of thirty patients during their 
first (probationary) year, they could treat no more than one hundred patients at a 
time with buprenorphine.96 Such obstacles have discouraged physicians from 
offering medication-assisted treatment for addiction.97 In 2016, SAMHSA raised the 
cap on the number of patients to 275 (after a physician had spent one year at the one-
hundred-patient cap),98 and in 2018 the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities 
Act included a provision that could loosen the prerequisites for a waiver even 
                                                   
93 See Schottenfeld et al., supra note 35, at 228 (“Primary care providers may legally 
prescribe methadone for pain with little to no training on how to do so safely, but they cannot 
prescribe it to treat addiction in primary care, since it can only be dispensed for that purpose 
from specially licensed clinical settings.”); see also Erik Eckholm & Olga Pierce, Methadone 
Rises as a Painkiller with Big Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2008, at A1 (“Methadone, once 
used mainly in addiction treatment centers to replace heroin, is today being given out by 
family doctors, osteopaths and nurse practitioners for throbbing backs, joint injuries and a 
host of other severe pains.”); Catherine Larkin, Advisory Issued on Methadone; The Drug 
Could Kill or Seriously Hurt New Patients Taking It for Pain, the FDA Says, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Nov. 28, 2006, at A6. 
94 See Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, tit. XXXV, 
§ 3502(a)(5), 114 Stat. 1101, 1222 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 823(g)(2)). 
95 See Christine Vestal, Few Doctors Sign up to Treat Opioid Addiction, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 15, 2016, at E1. In 2010, the FDA approved naltrexone (e.g., Vivitrol®) to treat 
addiction, though unlike the other two it operates as an opioid antagonist and therefore has 
no use as an analgesic. See id. (adding that “it is expensive and not widely used for opioid 
addiction in much of the country”). 
96 See 21 U.S.C. § 823(g)(2)(B), (G)(ii) (2018). 
97 See Goodnough, supra note 39, at A15 (“Only about 5 percent of the nation’s doctors 
are licensed to prescribe [buprenorphine], and shortages are especially acute in rural 
regions.”); see also C. Holly A. Andrilla et al., Barriers Rural Physicians Face Prescribing 
Buprenorphine for Opioid Use Disorder, 15 ANNALS FAM. MED. 359, 359 (2017). In 2016, 
Congress provided that nurse practitioners and physician assistants could also qualify after 
completing 24 hours of training. See Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, 
Pub. L. No. 114-198, § 303(a)(1)(C)(v), 130 Stat. 695, 721 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 823(g)(2)(G)(iv)). 
98 See Medication Assisted Treatment for Opioid Use Disorders, 81 Fed. Reg. 44,712, 
44,738–39 (July 8, 2016) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 8(F)); Juliet Eilperin, HHS Allows More 
Patients to Obtain Medication to Treat Opioid Addiction, WASH. POST, July 7, 2016, at A15. 
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further.99 Nonetheless, physicians can more easily prescribe narcotic analgesics than 
the controlled substances used to treat those addicted to such opioids.100 This 
arrangement strikes me as precisely backwards. 
In 2007, Congress granted the FDA authority to adopt various distribution 
controls—called “risk evaluation and mitigation strategy” (REMS) requirements, 
particularly the so-called “elements to assure safe use” (ETASU).101 These may 
include requirements that: 
 
(A) health care providers who prescribe the drug have particular 
training or experience, or are specially certified . . . ;  
(B) pharmacies, practitioners, or health care settings that dispense the 
drug are specially certified . . . ;  
(C) the drug be dispensed to patients only in certain health care 
settings, such as hospitals;  
(D) the drug be dispensed to patients with evidence or other 
documentation of safe-use conditions, such as laboratory test results;  
(E) each patient using the drug be subject to certain monitoring; or  
(F) each patient using the drug be enrolled in a registry.102 
 
More than a decade later, however, the FDA has not tested the full reach of these 
new powers. 
Each of the clauses in the statutory provision offers an opportunity for guarding 
against the irresponsible use of opioids.103 Indeed, the FDA could use its 
REMS/ETASU powers to impose on a nationally uniform basis many of the state-
                                                   
99 See Pub. L. No. 115-271, § 3202(a), 132 Stat. 3894, 3945 (2018) (to be codified at 
21 U.S.C. § 823(g)(2)(G)(ii)(VIII)) (allowing waivers for recent graduates based on proof of 
a certain amount of coverage of these issues in medical school). 
100 See Schottenfeld et al., supra note 35, at 228 (“[O]nce opioid use disorder develops, 
it is far more difficult for the same primary care providers to offer treatment than it was for 
them to contribute to the development of that disorder in the first place.”); id. at 232 (favoring 
the reduction of restrictions on the prescribing of buprenorphine in treating addicts); see also 
Melissa M. Ferrara, Comment, The Disparate Treatment of Addiction-Assistance 
Medications and Opiate Pain Medications Under the Law: Permitting the Proliferation of 
Opiates and Limiting Access to Treatment, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 741, 744, 756–61, 766–
67 (2012). 
101 See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 
§ 901(b), 121 Stat. 823, 926, 930–37 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)–(h)); see also Patricia 
J. Zettler, Toward Coherent Federal Oversight of Medicine, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 427, 463 
(2015) (“The drug manufacturer is the entity ultimately responsible for ensuring that REMS 
requirements are met—meaning that the drug manufacturer, and not medical practitioners, 
will be the subject of any FDA enforcement actions that result from REMS 
violations . . . [, though] practitioners are responsible for carrying out many of the elements 
to assure safe use.”). 
102 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(3) (2018). 
103 See Lewis S. Nelson & Jeanmarie Perrone, Curbing the Opioid Epidemic in the 
United States: The Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS), 308 JAMA 457 (2012). 
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level opioid initiatives that have drawn praise.104 For instance, clause (D) could 
support regular urine testing of patients to confirm appropriate use before issuing a 
new prescription (as the CDC guidelines recommended), much like the pregnancy 
tests required for drugs known to cause birth defects.105 Similarly, the agency might 
use clause (E) to insist that prescribers enter into “opioid agreements” with their 
patients as a few state legislatures have mandated.106 Although the clause (F) registry 
                                                   
104 In recent years, the states have taken the lead in addressing this crisis. See Barry 
Meier & Sabrina Tavernise, States Push to Curb Painkiller Overuse, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 
2016, at B1 (“[T]he pace of activity in states has grown so intense that experts are having 
difficulty keeping track. Currently, there are about 375 proposals in state legislatures that 
would regulate pain clinics and several aspects of prescribing painkillers . . . .”). See 
generally Andrew M. Parker et al., State Responses to the Opioid Crisis, 46 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 367, 368–76 (2018). Limitations on the number of doses to prescribe initially repre-
sent one popular response. See id. at 368 (“Half the states have limited the number of opioid 
pills that can be written in an initial prescription.”); id. at 369 (“Massachusetts . . . set a 
seven-day policy for new prescriptions, which has become the most common benchmark 
nationwide, though some states set limits as low as three days while others go up to 14 
days.”). 
105 See Lars Noah, The Little Agency That Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional 
and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 915 (2008) (“For instance, when it 
approved Thalomid® (thalidomide) for the treatment of leprosy patients, the FDA 
conditioned approval on extremely strict marketing controls because of the serious risk of 
birth defects: distribution only through specially registered physicians and pharmacists, and 
tracking of patients, who must agree to use two forms of contraception and undergo frequent 
pregnancy tests.”); Lars Noah, Too High a Price for Some Drugs?: The FDA Burdens 
Reproductive Choice, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 231, 234–35 (2007) (explaining that, in 2001, 
the FDA approved Hoffmann-La Roche’s program for Accutane® (isotretinoin), which 
“attempted to require (through physician registration with the manufacturer and use of 
special qualification stickers as a prerequisite for dispensing by pharmacists) a negative 
pregnancy test before prescribing a nonrefillable one month supply in addition to an 
agreement by patients to use two methods of contraception or abstain from sexual activity”); 
id. at 233–39 (elaborating on these and other efforts to restrict access to teratogenic drugs); 
id. at 245 (explaining the nominally voluntary nature of these programs given the agency’s 
lack of delegated authority to mandate them at the time); see also id. at 245–46 (“In the event 
of widespread noncompliance by physicians, pharmacists, or patients, the FDA could 
threaten to withdraw the manufacturer’s license to sell the drug, but it could take no action 
against noncompliant providers or users.”); id. at 248–58 (questioning the constitutionality 
of the indirectly imposed requirement for the concomitant use of contraceptives). 
106 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-7-707(a)(2) (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 94C 
§ 18A(b) (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-15.2(e), (g) (2018); see also Michelle Andrews, 
When Patients Have to Sign “Pain Contracts,” WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2011, at E4. These laws 
seek to reduce rates of abuse either because the added burden created by such mandates make 
health professionals hesitate or because the agreements usefully engage patients in 
minimizing risks. See Joanna L. Starrels et al., Systematic Review: Treatment Agreements 
and Urine Drug Testing to Reduce Opioid Misuse in Patients with Chronic Pain, 152 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 712, 717–18 (2010). In 2009, the FDA suggested including such a 
requirement in its opioid REMS but then dropped the idea in the face of objections. See 
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contemplates more of an epidemiological undertaking, it could allow for the creation 
of a federal version of the prescription drug monitoring databases (PDMPs) now 
used in various ways in every state.107 More broadly, the agency might cap the 
duration of use more stringently than the DEA’s current ninety-day limit on a single 
prescription for Schedule II drugs.108 
The first three clauses of the statutory provision quoted above would allow even 
more onerous restrictions on access. In fact, the FDA imposed a hospital-only 
limitation under clause (C) when it recently approved a sublingual tablet form of 
sufentanil (Dsuvia),109 and perhaps other narcotic analgesics belong only in skilled 
nursing facilities or hospice centers. The FDA could demand more careful scrutiny 
by pharmacists, as some states have done, pursuant to clause (B). Potentially the 
most powerful REMS/ETASU authority, clause (A), adds parenthetically that “the 
opportunity to obtain such [prescriber] training or certification with respect to the 
drug shall be available to any willing provider from a frontier area in a widely 
available training or certification method (including an on-line course or via mail) 
as approved by the Secretary.”110 Interestingly, however, no such caveat applies (nor 
                                                   
Richard Payne et al., A Rose by Any Other Name: Pain Contracts/Agreements, AM. J. 
BIOETHICS, Nov. 2010, at 5, 7. 
107 See Notice of Public Hearing, Opioid Policy Steering Committee: Prescribing 
Intervention—Exploring a Strategy for Implementation, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,572, 58,574 (Dec. 
13, 2017); see also Rebecca L. Haffajee, Preventing Opioid Misuse with Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Programs: A Framework for Evaluating the Success of State Public Health 
Laws, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1621, 1632 (2016) (“PDMPs are a popular, state-level, legal 
mechanism that have gained the reputation of having incredible promise for addressing 
opioid misuse.”); id. at 1634–37, 1685–86 (elaborating); id. at 1672–76 (reviewing the 
literature on their effectiveness); Joanna Shepherd, Combating the Prescription Painkiller 
Epidemic: A National Prescription Drug Reporting Program, 40 AM. J.L. & MED. 85, 110–
12 (2014) (advocating the creation of a federal PDMP). 
108 Cf. supra note 60 (discussing FDA efforts to limit the number of dosage units 
dispensed). A rule adopted by the DEA allowed a limited circumvention of the statutory 
prohibition on refills for Schedule II drugs by letting patients receive three 30-day 
prescriptions at a single visit. See Issuance of Multiple Prescriptions for Schedule II 
Controlled Substances, 72 Fed. Reg. 64,921, 64,930 (Nov. 19, 2007) (codified at 21 C.F.R. 
§ 1306.12(b)). 
109 See Abby Goodnough, F.D.A. Clears Potent Opioid Despite Worry Abuse Is Likely, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2018, at A12 (“[I]ts only permitted use will be in hospitals, surgical 
centers and other medically supervised settings. . . . Dsuvia will not be dispensed to patients 
for home use or available at retail pharmacies, and . . . it should only be administered by 
health care providers with the single-dose applicators.”); see also id. (adding that the REMS 
also required “monitoring distribution of the drug and auditing wholesalers’ data; evaluating 
whether hospitals and other health care providers are using the drug properly; and monitoring 
for any diversion or abuse”); cf. Swayze v. McNeil Labs., Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 465–66, 471–
72 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing allegations about poorly supervised surgical use of Sublimaze® 
(fentanyl) by certified registered nurse anesthetists in Mississippi hospitals). 
110 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(3)(A) (2018). A similar caveat appears in the second clause, 
which relates to dispensers. Congress more generally specified that ETASU requirements 
must “not be unduly burdensome on patient access to the drug.” Id. § 355-1(f)(2)(C). In 
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could it) to the option of demanding that a prescriber have “particular . . . 
experience,” which would seem to allow requiring expertise not attainable through 
a quickie distance training session. 
In one of its first attempts to use this power on a class-wide basis, the agency 
initiated a REMS process for extended-release (long-acting) opioids that would have 
allowed prescribing only after a physician had completed an educational program.111 
Physicians evidently resisted this idea, with one survey reporting that more than 13 
percent of primary care doctors would stop prescribing opioids if first forced to take 
4–8 hours of training.112 To me that means the proposed training requirement was 
not nearly onerous enough, but the FDA took precisely the opposite lesson away 
from such feedback and opted for a voluntary approach.113 More recently, however, 
it has expressed renewed interest in mandatory training for prescribers.114 
                                                   
construing this caveat, however, the FDA should reference its approved labeling as defining 
the narrow class of appropriate patients. 
111 See Notice of Public Meeting, Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies for Certain 
Opioid Drugs, 74 Fed. Reg. 17,967, 17,969 (Apr. 20, 2009); Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. to Place 
New Limits on Prescriptions of Narcotics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at A13; see also Notice 
of Availability, Draft Blueprint for Prescriber Education for Long-Acting/Extended-Release 
Opioid Class-Wide Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,766 (Nov. 7, 
2011). A few states subsequently imposed such a requirement. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH 
LAW § 3309-a(3) (2018) (requiring three hours of specialized training every three years). 
112 See Kieran A. Slevin & Michael A. Ashburn, Primary Care Physician Opinion 
Survey on FDA Opioid Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies, 7 J. OPIOID MGMT. 109 
(2011). Other researchers noted that some health care providers had expressed concerns that 
ETASU may cause improper substitutions, including “non-REMS pain drugs, such as 
Tylenol III, for Onsolis in order to avoid having to comply with the REMS requirements.” 
Andrew Wilson & Christopher-Paul Milne, FDA’s Risk Evaluation and Mitigation 
Strategies (REMS): Effective and Efficient Safety Tools or Process Poltergeist, 66 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 569, 579 (2011); see also id. at 580 (noting a similar comment from surveyed 
pharmacists). Encouraging the substitution of a Schedule II (fentanyl) drug with a Schedule 
III (acetaminophen with codeine) drug strikes me, however, as a generally favorable 
consequence. 
113 See Notice of Public Workshop, Training Health Care Providers on Pain 
Management and Safe Use of Opioid Analgesics—Exploring the Path Forward, 82 Fed. Reg. 
18,300, 18,302 (Apr. 18, 2017) (“The ER/LA Opioid Analgesics REMS [approved in July 
2012] requires that prescriber training in the form of accredited continuing education be 
made available to health care providers who prescribe ER/LA opioid analgesics.”); John F. 
Peppin et al., Issues and Critiques of the Forthcoming Risk Evaluation and Mitigation 
Strategy (REMS) for Opioids in Pain Management, 27 ISSUES L. & MED. 91, 98–109, 114–
16, 118–19 (2012); Barry Meier, F.D.A. Won’t Order Doctors to Get Pain-Drug Training, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2012, at B2. In 2016, a pair of advisory committees recommended, 
among other changes, extending this REMS to cover immediate-release (IR) opioids and 
making the prescriber training mandatory. See Notice of Availability, Draft Revisions to the 
Food and Drug Administration Blueprint for Prescriber Education for Extended-Release and 
Long-Acting Opioids, 82 Fed. Reg. 21,818, 21,819 (May 10, 2017). 
114 See Laurie McGinley, FDA Plans New Rules for Opioid Makers, WASH. POST, July 
11, 2017, at A6; Barry Meier, Training Is Weighed for Opioid Prescribers, N.Y. TIMES, May 
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Educational outreach of this type has not, however, worked particularly well in 
promoting adherence to clinical practice guidelines.115 
Separately, to guard against the dangerous off-label use of transmucosal 
immediate-release fentanyl (TIRF) products, which it approved to treat 
breakthrough pain in cancer patients already taking (and tolerant to) other opioids, 
the FDA exercised its ETASU authority in 2011 to create a special distribution 
oversight program that imposed far greater restrictions than the REMS for other 
opioids.116 As later summarized by the agency, this program “requires that 
healthcare providers who prescribe TIRF medicines for outpatient use are specially 
certified, that pharmacies that dispense TIRF medicines for inpatient and outpatient 
use are specially certified, and that completion of the prescriber-patient agreement 
form occurs prior to dispensing TIRF medicines for outpatient use.”117 Because, 
however, the FDA left implementation up to the industry, the effort reportedly has 
failed to accomplish its goals.118 The agency needs to show its willingness to enforce 
                                                   
3, 2016, at B1. In discussing steps that the agency might now take, FDA officials noted that 
sodium oxybate, a non-opioid controlled substance derivative approved for narcolepsy 
(Xyrem®), faces a number of distribution restrictions including prescriber certification, 
patient enrollment, and dispensing from only a single mail-order pharmacy. See Gottlieb & 
Woodcock, supra note 83, at 422. 
115 See Noah, supra note 88, at 396 & n.94, 421–22 & n.210; see also Elizabeth A. 
McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the United States, 348 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2635, 2641–44 (2003) (finding widespread failures by physicians to 
follow patient care guidelines); Aaron E. Carroll, It’s Hard for Doctors to Unlearn Things. 
That’s Costly for All of Us, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2018, at B5 (“The public shares some 
culpability. Americans often seem to prefer more care than less. But a lot of it still comes 
from physicians, and from our inability to stop when the evidence tells us to. Professional 
organizations and others that issue such guidelines also seem better at telling physicians 
about new practices than about abandoning old ones.”). 
116 See Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS): Transmucosal 
Immediate-Release Fentanyl (TIRF) Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/rems/index.cfm?event=RemsDetails.page&RE
MS=60 [https://perma.cc/GDB4-F9G8]; see also Identification of Drug and Biological 
Products Deemed to Have Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies for Purposes of the 
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, 73 Fed. Reg. 16,313, 16,314 (Mar. 
27, 2008) (converting sixteen voluntary undertakings into REMS, including one for the 
fentanyl lollipop Actiq). 
117 Notice of Meeting, Joint Meeting of the Drug Safety and Risk Management 
Advisory Committee and the Anesthetic and Analgesic Drug Products Advisory Committee, 
83 Fed. Reg. 32,134, 32,135 (July 11, 2018). 
118 See Emily Baumgaertner, F.D.A. Documents Show It Failed to Stop Misuse of a 
Fast-Acting Opioid, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2018, at A13 (“About 5,000 pages of documents, 
obtained by researchers at Johns Hopkins University through the Freedom of Information 
Act . . . , show that the F.D.A. had data showing that so-called off-label prescribing was 
widespread. But officials did little to intervene.”). See generally Jeffrey Eric Rollman et al., 
Assessment of the FDA Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy for Transmucosal 
Immediate-Release Fentanyl Products, 321 JAMA 676 (2019). 
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such requirements by visiting meaningful sanctions on noncompliant manufacturers 
of these products. 
To my mind, the time has come for the FDA to take opioid analgesics out of 
the hands of primary care physicians, dentists, and other health care professionals 
apt to prescribe these drugs inappropriately.119 Instead, chronic pain patients would 
have to get referred to specialists with the expertise to assess a patient’s need for 
powerful relief and consider alternative treatments—in other words, reserve long-
acting opioids as a last resort.120 After it received express authority in 2007 to impose 
distribution controls, the agency could limit the power to prescribe certain 
particularly hazardous drugs to only a subset of health care professionals, along the 
same lines that Congress has restricted the Schedule III drug buprenorphine when 
used in treating addiction.121 
Alternatively, Congress could decide to prohibit any and all off-label usage of 
Schedule II drugs. It did so once before with a narrow class of controlled 
substances,122 and the DEA attempted to do so as well in connection with another 
                                                   
119 Unlike the DEA, which may revoke federal licenses to prescribe controlled 
substances on an individual basis (and only for cause), see 21 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2018), the 
FDA could use its REMS/ETASU authority to exclude large swaths of state-licensed 
prescribers without having to surmount the same procedural hurdles imposed on the DEA. 
120 See Noah, supra note 1, at 63 (“[T]he DEA urged Purdue Pharma to consider 
restricting distribution [of OxyContin] to pain management specialists on the theory that 
these physicians would know to use the drug only as a last resort, if other pharmaceutical 
options did not help a patient.”); Schottenfeld et al., supra note 35, at 226–27; cf. id. at 232 
(“[S]ome states (such as Rhode Island) require primary care providers to consult with a pain 
medicine specialist or justify not doing so when opioids above a certain dose are 
prescribed.”); id. at 234 (disagreeing with this approach). Specialists can, of course, fall prey 
to the same fads and marketing pitches as general practitioners. See, e.g., Catan & Perez, 
supra note 14, at A1 (focusing on Dr. Russell Portenoy and his subsequent change of heart); 
Barry Meier, Tightening the Lid on Pain Prescriptions: Doctors Shift Amid Alarm on 
Overuse, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2012, at A1 (focusing on Dr. Jane Ballantyne and her revised 
views); see also Noah, supra note 88, at 405 & n.139 (warning of some of the dangers 
associated with medical specialization). 
121 See supra notes 94–99; see also Ferrara, supra note 100, at 763 (“OxyContin 
prescribers should be required to meet similar training standards. The OxyContin REMS is 
insufficient to ensure that practitioners are properly trained. Although information that the 
manufacturer provides to practitioners contains useful guidelines, there is no requirement 
that practitioners follow the guidelines, or even read the materials before prescribing the 
medication.”); id. (“Perhaps a DEA registration-and-waiver structure similar to that 
applicable to buprenorphine should also apply to OxyContin. This would allow practitioners 
with particularized training in pain management to prescribe OxyContin, and encourage . . . 
patients to pursue care with a practitioner with expertise in relieving pain.”). 
122 See 21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) (2018) (prohibiting the distribution of human growth 
hormone (HGH) for off-label use); see also United States v. Bader, 678 F.3d 858, 874–75 
(10th Cir. 2012); Thomas T. Perls et al., Provision or Distribution of Growth Hormone for 
“Antiaging”: Clinical and Legal Issues, 294 JAMA 2086, 2087–88 (2005); Zettler, supra 
note 101, at 457–59 (concluding that Congress sought primarily to prohibit off-label uses 
that lacked any therapeutic purpose, including by athletes); cf. id. at 488 (“[S]ome 
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Schedule II drug.123 However accomplished, such a move would no doubt infuriate 
many physicians and the powerful associations that represent their interests,124 but 
so far they have largely managed to avoid taking responsibility for getting so easily 
duped by the pharmaceutical industry. In turn, drug manufacturers, who in the past 
may have preferred seeking approval only for the narrowest use while counting on 
widespread off-label prescribing,125 would now have incentives to try to convince 
the FDA that their products deserve approval for “broad spectrum” usage; if they 
failed to do so, then only a narrow class of patients would receive such treatments. 
At least with respect to the provisions addressing the FDA, the SUPPORT for 
Patients and Communities Act grants the agency little in the way of new authority; 
instead, this recently enacted legislation seems more preoccupied with nudging 
regulatory officials to make fuller use of their existing powers. It should not take yet 
another act of Congress to prod the FDA into taking serious—even if unpopular—
steps that might come to grips with a problem that it had helped to unleash. 
Obviously, an urgent need exists for other efforts to address those individuals 
already harmed by past prescribing practices, but we can still take measures to guard 
against creating even more addicts as well as learn a lesson before another 
prescription drug epidemic emerges. 
                                                   
commentators estimate that thirty percent of prescriptions for HGH are off-label, despite the 
prohibition on such prescription.”); id. at 498 n.410 (“The FDA has not exercised its REMS 
authority to prohibit off-label prescribing of drugs . . . .”); Jeff Swiatek, FDA OKs Lilly 
Growth Drug, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 26, 2003, at 1C (reporting that, in approving 
expanded use of Humatrope® to treat very short children, the FDA persuaded the 
manufacturer to market this new use only to pediatric endocrinologists). 
123 See Noah, supra note 89, at 179 & n.130 (discussing the DEA’s threat when it 
downscheduled the marijuana derivative dronabinol (Marinol®) to revoke the registration of 
any practitioner dispensing this anti-emetic beyond the FDA’s approved use in cancer 
patients). Insofar as a few states have specifically authorized certain off-label uses of 
Schedule II drugs, Congress might want to exempt these from such a prohibition. 
124 See Noah, supra note 57, at 74–75 (conceding that “any such initiative would trigger 
howls of protest from physician groups”); Meier, supra note 114, at B1 (reporting that the 
AMA strenuously objected when the FDA first proposed mandatory prescriber training for 
opioids); see also Lars Noah, The Whole “Truthiness,” 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 261, 263 
(2014) (“Although it surely would offend the American Medical Association, which makes 
the idea politically unrealistic, such a conduct-focused solution to this supposedly intractable 
problem [of off-label prescription drug use] would not offend the Constitution, and . . . 
plainly would allow a ban on any affiliated advertising.”); Parker et al., supra note 104, at 
369 (“Leaders of organizations including the American Medical Association . . . argue that 
[opioid] prescription limits undermine patient care because they are too rigid and interfere 
with doctors’ ability to create appropriate, individualized treatment plans.”); Zettler, supra 
note 101, at 441–46 (discussing the AMA’s political clout). 
125 See, e.g., Katie Thomas, Drug Company Enlists Doctors Under Scrutiny: Big 
Payments for Top Painkiller Prescribers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2014, at A1 (“The aggressive 
marketing of Subsys [by Insys], the company’s only brand-name product, is especially 
remarkable, given that its use is highly restricted; it is approved only for cancer patients who 
are already taking opioid painkillers around the clock. Previous analyses have shown that 
only 1 percent of prescriptions for the product are written by cancer specialists.”). 
